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Abstract: From ancient Greece to the present, philosophers have variously emphasized either
the similarities or the differences between humans and nonhuman animals as a basis for ethical
conclusions. Thus animal ethics has traditionally involved both factual claims, usually about
animals’ mental states and capacities, and ethical claims about their moral standing. However,
even in modern animal ethics the factual claims are often scientifically uninformed, involve
broad generalizations about diverse taxonomic groups, and show little agreement about how to
resolve the contradictions. Research in cognitive ethology and animal welfare science provides
empirical material and a set of emerging methods for testing the plausibility of claims about
animal mentation and thus for clarifying the interests and needs of animals. We suggest that
progress in animal ethics requires both philosophically informed science to provide an
empirically grounded understanding of animals, and scientifically informed philosophy to
explore the ethical implications that follow.
Introduction.
As human opinion wavered from century to century, two distinct attitudes toward
beasts have stood out prominently. Sometimes men have held the anthropomorphic
view that animals and men are very much alike, with the same emotions and similar
mental powers...At times other men have held stubbornly to the anthropocentric
opinion that this is a man’s world and that an unbridgeable chasm yawns between the
human race and the other species. ¾ Dix Harwood, Love for Animals and How It
Developed in Great Britain (1928)1
The history of animal ethics in Western discourse, Harwood advises us, demonstrates an
enduring tension between those who emphasize the similarities between humans and other
species, and those who emphasize the differences. And, as he went on to demonstrate, historical
changes in factual beliefs about the similarity of humans and animals were accompanied by
changing ethical beliefs about the moral standing of animals.
The Historical Debate.
The disagreement dates back to ancient Greece. Sextus Empiricus, an important figure in the
development of the Greek school of philosophical skepticism, reported the Pythagorean side of
the debate:
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Pythagoras and Empedocles and the rest of the Italians2 say that we have a fellowship not
only with one another and the gods but also with the irrational animals.3 For there is a
single spirit which pervades the whole world as a sort of soul and which unites us with
them. That is why, if we kill them and eat their flesh, we commit injustice and impiety,
inasmuch as we are killing our kin.4
The most detailed account of the Pythagorean view came from the fourth-century neo-Platonist
Porphyry. He opposed the Stoics who, he says, deny all reason to other species,5 whereas, for
Porphyry, the difference in reason between humans and animals:
appears to consist, as Aristotle somewhere says,6 not in essence, but in the more and the
less... It does not follow, if we have more intelligence than other animals, that on this
account they are to be deprived of intelligence; as neither must it be said, that partridges do
not fly, because hawks fly higher...brutes are rational animals, reason in most of them being
imperfect. Since, however, justice pertains to rational beings as our opponents say, how is
it possible not to admit, that we should act justly toward brutes.7
The “opponents ” cited by Porphyry were the Stoics who, in Porphyry's view, insisted that we
share no relevant common attributes with animals that would oblige us to treat them with justice.
The earliest recorded statement of this kind came from the fourth century BC historian
Xenophon, who, in his Memorabilia (I, iv, 2), has his friend Socrates proclaim man corporeally
unique “in possessing erect posture, hands, speech, sexual appetite ‘unbroken to old age,’” and
psychically unique “in his knowledge of the gods, ability to anticipate and therefore provide
against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, and in his ability to learn.”8 Accordingly, Xenophon
tells us, God has a special love for man, and “the beasts are born and bred for man’s sake.” (IV,
iii, 9-12). Similarly, the Roman emperor and Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius maintained that
only humans are rational, social, and capable of, and hence entitled to, justice. The animals are
entitled to generous treatment and no more: “As to the animals which have not reason...do thou,
since thou have reason, and they have none, make use of them with a generous and liberal spirit.
But toward human beings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit...”9 To the animals we
have an obligation which arises from the generosity of the human spirit; to our fellow humans we
have a far greater obligation which arises from our common rational nature and kinship.
 The debate has continued throughout the history of Western thought. In the Middle Ages
St. Augustine announced in distinctly Stoic vein in The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life
that “we see and appreciate from their cries that animals die with pain. But man disregards this in
a beast, with which, as having no rational soul, he is linked by no community of law.”10 By
contrast, William Langland in Piers the Ploughman lauded the superior reason of the animals.
Having commented on how he learned to love his Creator from the lessons taught by the
animals, and how he was in awe of their accomplishments, he concluded: “Yet the thing that
moved me most, and changed my way of thinking, was that Reason ruled and cared for all the
beasts, except only for man and his mate; for many a time they wandered ungoverned by
Reason.”11 If, for Langland, it was reason in animals that requires our consideration for their
interests, for St. Bernardine of Siena it was their morality: “Look at the pigs who have so much
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compassion for each other, that when one of them squeals, the others will run to help...And you
children who steal the baby swallows. What do other swallows do? They all gather together to
try to help the fledglings...Man is more evil than the birds.”12
 In the Renaissance the battle lines were firmly drawn. For example, René Descartes
claimed that animals are fundamentally different from humans in being only “extended things”
(res extensa), while humans are, in addition, “thinking things” (res cogitans). In the Second
Meditation, for example, he wrote:
I may by chance look out of a window and notice some men passing in the street, at the
sight of whom I do not fail to say that I see men...and nevertheless what do I see from this
window except hats and clothes...? But I judge that they are men and thus I comprehend,
solely by the faculty of judgment which resides in my mind, that which I believed I saw
with my eyes.13
To Descartes, mere animals possess no such faculty of judgment. This proved an affront to the
logician and Catholic priest Pierre Gassendi. He had already declared: “I restore reason to the
animals; I find no distinction between the understanding and the imagination.”14 Now he took
Descartes firmly to task. The dog, he insisted, “also perceives that a man, or his master, is hidden
under the hat and clothes, and even under a variety of different forms...if likewise a dog realizes
that there is a man underneath when he sees nothing but his hat and clothes, is it not true, I say,
that you should also think that the existence of a mentality like yours is evidenced by the dog.”15
For Descartes, the animals’ lack of rationality permitted their exploitative use in animal
experimentation. By contrast, Gassendi argued that their possession of rationality increased our
responsibilities toward them: “There is no pretence for saying that any right has been granted to
us by [moral] law to kill any of those animals which are not destructive or pernicious to the
human race.”16 In a letter to his friend Johann van Helmont, he even went so far as to argue a
good case for vegetarianism,17 though it seems unlikely he followed his own prescriptions.
 Notoriously, in the Enlightenment era, Immanuel Kant announced the categorical
imperative, but declared animals incapable of benefiting from it. Thus in the Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals (1785), he formulated the imperative as: “Act in such a manner that you
treat humanity, both in your own person and that of any other, always as an end and never
solely as a means.”18 Despite his claim that “we can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of
animals,” our duty is toward ourselves and our character, not toward the animals themselves. For
Kant, “Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. The end is
man.”19 By contrast, Johann Wolfgang Goethe borrowed the categorical imperative to
accommodate the interests of animals. Convinced as he was, partly based on his anatomical
investigations, that human-animal parallels were complete, save for the human possession of a
moral sense,20 which he regarded as a cultural acquisition, Goethe concluded in his
Metamorphose der Tiere that “Each animal is an end in itself” (Zweck sein selbst ist jegliches
Tier).21 This was in direct imitation of one of Kant’s formulations of the imperative:
“Humankind and in general each rational being exists as an end in itself,” as Zweck an sich
selbst.22 Correspondingly in Faust: Part Two he tells the godhead: “You lead the ranks of living
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creatures before me/ To teach me to know my brothers/ Of the still bush, the air, and water.”23
The kinship of animals with humans requires a corresponding obligation on our part. Each
animal is to be treated as an end in itself.
 Thus, although the criteria of relevance have not always been the same — varying from
reason to kinship to a moral sense to sociality to a common soul to self-consciousness — writers
through the ages have disagreed about whether humans and other species possess similar relevant
attributes, usually seen as mental attributes; and this claim about the nature of animals has
usually determined whether, or how much, other species are entitled to moral consideration.
The Modern Debate.
Modern approaches to animal ethics display a similar tension. On the one hand, some ethicists
attribute characteristics to animals that are similar to those of humans and propose that animals
and humans should be treated with the same principles of equality, rights and justice. To take a
standard example, Peter Singer used two criteria — behavioral signs of pain, and possession of a
nervous system similar to that of humans24 — to identify a broad class of animals that he
considered to be capable of suffering, and on this basis he proposed “extending the principle of
equality to nonhuman animals.”25 Similarly, David DeGrazia argued that many animals
(including all vertebrates) are sentient and hence worthy of moral concern.26 His argument began
with human phenomenology which helps “categorize mental states and informs us of what they
feel like,”27 and he argued that we can conclude that animals share the same states based on
Singer’s two criteria plus a third: that the mental state in question serves an important biological
function for the animal in its particular environmental niche. Tom Regan painted a rich and
human-like portrait of the mental lives of animals, claiming that they — at least “mentally
normal mammals of a year or more”28 — possess:
beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own
future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and
welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a
psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their
experiential life fares well or ill for them...29
Regan used this portrait of animals in developing his rights-based ethic from which he concluded
that current uses of animals in agriculture, hunting, trapping, science and education should
cease.
 On the other hand, opposing ethicists claim there is a fundamental dissimilarity between
humans and other species, and argue correspondingly that we are fully entitled to use animals
for food, experimentation, and other purposes. While accepting that “all mammals, at least, have
beliefs, desires and sensations,” Peter Carruthers nonetheless claimed that “human beings are
unique amongst members of the animal kingdom in possessing conscious mental states.”30
Carruthers thus considered that the beliefs, desires and sensations of animals are not consciously
experienced, and even “their pains must all be non-conscious ones.” He concluded, “since their
pains are non-conscious, they make no real claims upon our sympathy.” Hence, “there is no
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basis for extending moral protection to animals beyond that which is already provided.”31
 In Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective, Michael Leahy allowed a certain
degree of consciousness in other species, but still saw a great gulf between humans and
nonhuman animals. For example, he claimed that an animal “will be aware of its prey in that it
consciously perceives, pursues, and devours it,” but, given that the animal lacks language “there
will be no possibility of self-consciousness entering the equation.”32 In the same vein, Leahy
remarked that many emotions, such as grief, need to be seen as “linguistic transactions”; he
acknowledged that animals can “manifest relatively short-term distress at, say, the loss of a
mate” but “without language it cannot consider its plight.”33 Thus, he concluded, “lacking
language, animal behavior does not have meaning for them as it can for us.”34 And on that basis
Leahy defended the traditional use of animals, for food and research, for example, against claims
that such use violates basic ethical principles.
 In some respects, R.G. Frey, in Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals, went
further. He claimed that because animals do not have language, they lack not only
self-consciousness but beliefs as well. Lacking beliefs and self-consciousness, they cannot have
consciously held desires. And lacking such desires, Frey concluded “that animals have neither
interests nor moral rights.”35
 Thus, in the modern debate as in the historical one, we often see philosophers falling into
Harwood’s two camps, some attributing characteristics to animals that make them appear similar
to humans in the possession of beliefs, desires, consciousness, self-awareness and other features,
which are interpreted to entail human responsibilities toward other species, while others claim a
fundamental dissimilarity which they see as justifying the continued use of animals for human
purposes.
The Two Tasks.
Throughout both the historical and the modern debate we see philosophers attempting two
distinct tasks. One is the ethical task of determining the appropriate moral principles and how
they should be applied to animals; the other is the factual task of describing the relevant
attributes — especially the mental attributes — of animals. Historically, “philosophy” included
both ethics and the study of the natural world. Thus at the time of Pythagoras or Marcus
Aurelius or Gassendi the philosopher’s task was seen to be both normative and scientific. Today,
however, these endeavors are largely distinct, and when ethicists attempt the factual task of
understanding the mental attributes of animals, their efforts are marked by three features which,
when viewed from the vantage point of those engaged in the empirical study of animals, seem
unlikely to resolve the debates.
 First, many of the claims about animals made by ethicists are broad generalizations about
very diverse taxonomic groups. Many ethicists speak in general terms about “animals” with little
or no attempt at subdivision. For example, when Leahy argued that animals lack
self-consciousness, and when Carruthers claimed that animals lack conscious mental states, they
appeared to include all animal species from invertebrates to the great apes. Regan was more
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precise in limiting his claims to mature mammals, but the rich and human-like portrait of mental
life that he attributes to this group — including a sense of their own future and a psychophysical
identity over time — makes a plausible fit to the behavior we observe in chimpanzees but less so
in, say, hamsters. Singer’s call for the interests of animals to be respected would, in theory,
allow for taxonomic distinctions, and Singer acknowledged that interests will vary across
taxonomic groups; in practice, however, Singer paid little attention to taxonomic differences,
proposing, for example, that consumers refuse to purchase products that have been “tested on
animals.”36
 Second, many of the claims are grounded only loosely, if at all, on empirical observations.
To be sure, Singer made some use of empirical observations; for example, he referred to two
scientific publications when including crustaceans as animals capable of possessing interests,37
and he used a description of chimpanzee behavior, recorded and interpreted by Jane Goodall, to
portray chimpanzees as capable of devising plans for the future, arguing on this basis that such
an animal “must be aware of itself as a distinct entity, existing over time.”38 Still his use of
empirical evidence was sporadic and selective. Leahy made more extensive use of animal
behavior research, but he dismissed the work of Goodall as “intellectually relaxed,”39 stating a
preference for “instinctive” explanations of behavior that avoid any reference to mental states,
rather than the kind of cognitive explanation that Goodall and others provide. Regan’s chapter
entitled “Animal Welfare” in The Case for Animal Rights (1983), which discusses the attributes
of animals, contained 28 footnotes, mostly to the work of other philosophers, and virtually none
to the growing body of scientific research on animal welfare.
 Third, in arriving at their very different conclusions about the mental capacities and mental
states of other animals, philosophers have shown no agreement over the kind of methods that
would allow their contradictory claims to be tested or resolved. As we have noted, some made
reference to empirical studies, but usually in a selective rather than a comprehensive way. Others
used quite different approaches. Carruthers and Frey, for example, relied in part on reflecting on
the nature of human consciousness. Carruthers proposed that:
a conscious experience is a state whose existence and content are available to be
consciously thought about (that is, available for description in acts of thinking that are
themselves made available to further acts of thinking).40
Assuming that “no one would seriously maintain that dogs, cats, sheep, cattle, pigs, or chickens
consciously think things to themselves,” he concluded that “the experience of all these creatures
will be of the non-conscious variety.”41 Frey, like Leahy, emphasized the role played by
language in the human experience of consciousness and self-consciousness, arguing on this basis
that animals, lacking language, could not have comparable experiential states. Regan was
particularly eclectic in developing his view of animal minds. His “Cumulative Argument” for
animal consciousness involved a heterogeneous mixture of elements, including an appeal to
commonsense understanding of animals, the fact that people attribute consciousness to animals
in ordinary use of language, a claim that the behavior of animals is consistent with their being
conscious, a recognition that evolution makes animal consciousness a theoretical possibility, and
various other arguments.
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 Perhaps as a result of these three features, the modern debate often seems not to have
advanced greatly beyond the stage reached in the historical debate between the Pythagoreans
and the Stoics, or Descartes and Gassendi, or those Enlightenment philosophers who thought of
animals as means and those who described them as ends, with both sides making broad
generalizations about "animals" that simply contradict those of their opponents, with little (or
mainly selective) use of empirical observations to justify those claims; and, lacking any
agreement on an appropriate methodology for resolving the contradictions, it is hard to imagine
that the current approaches will move toward consensus.
Cognitive Ethology and Animal Welfare Science.
Perhaps, then, it would be more productive to try a different approach for the factual task of
understanding the mental states and mental capacities of other species — an approach that
acknowledges the immense diversity of animals, and one that uses empirical data and explicit
methodology for testing the plausibility of claims about the mental capacities and mental states
of animals. Two fields of science are potential contributors.
 One is cognitive ethology — a field which attempts to build a picture of the mental,
information-processing capacities of different animal species, based largely on observations and
experiments concerning their behavior. The field had clear antecedents in the comparative
psychology studies of a century ago, and in the work of field naturalists who, by the 1960s, were
recording the complex behavior and social relations of known individuals of mentally advanced
species such as chimpanzees and baboons. Many of these observations seemed impossible to
explain in stimulus-response terms; this led investigators to postulate mental processes — such
as planning, intention, and deception — in the animals they studied. To take one well known
example, Jane Goodall recorded the case of a chimpanzee who rose in social status by collecting
empty kerosene cans and banging them together noisily while charging into a group of other
chimpanzees. Goodall, obviously recognizing that theories of instinctive behavior could not
plausibly account for such actions, proposed that the chimpanzee used intelligence and planning
to carry out these displays.42
 These field observations have been supplemented by studies of animal communication
through the use of American Sign Language and other means. These have provided unique
opportunities to explore the mental processes of animals. In one example, the gorilla Koko,
when shown a picture of herself at her birthday party, signed “me love happy Koko there,”
indicating that Koko retained, and could reflect on, memories of her past life.43
 Drawing on these and other studies, Hart and Karmel asked the broader question of
whether great apes and monkeys show evidence of having a sense of self.44 They proposed that
five elements comprise a sense of self: (1) objective self-awareness, or the ability to distinguish
oneself from the rest of the world; (2) subjective self-awareness, consisting of identification or
emotional involvement with those stimuli that correspond to oneself; (3) possession of personal
memories; (4) the ability to form representations of oneself, and (5) the ability to hold theories
about oneself, such as what parts of oneself are central and how different facets of oneself are
interrelated. Reviewing the available literature, Hart and Karmel concluded that the great apes
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(chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans) show evidence of possessing the first four attributes, but
no evidence of the fifth, whereas monkeys show relatively little evidence of possessing a basic
sense of self. They thus concluded there is a qualitative difference between monkeys and the
great apes, whereas the difference between the great apes and humans is “largely quantitative.”45
 The work of cognitive ethologists, although largely motivated by a simple desire to
understand animal mentation, raises many philosophical issues that need to be explored.46 For
example, what is the role of language in the various types of self-awareness, and does lack of
language make these states morally less relevant? What are appropriate criteria for assigning the
term “person” — with all its moral implications — to a being? Are animals that show empathy
and concern for others more deserving of concern for themselves? If a species of animal does not
show evidence of self-awareness, how should we take account of the possibility that we are
simply unable to recognize the relevant signs?
 Despite the importance of understanding the cognitive powers of animals, it is their
affective states — hedonically negative or positive experiences, such as pain, fear, frustration,
and pleasure — that are at the heart of much ethical concern about the human treatment of
animals, and these states have become a major focus of research in the field of animal welfare
science. The field grew out of the proposal by W.H. Thorpe in 1965 that scientists should use
the tools of science to understand the many features that make up the welfare of animals.47
Thorpe indicated, for example, how research could be used to detect pain and discomfort, to
identify environments that animals prefer, and to understand the capacity to form learned fear of
humans. He also noted the problem of animals prevented from carrying out types of natural
behavior that they are strongly motivated to perform. He cited, for example, “the night-long
agitated flutterings of a migratory bird confined in a cage during migration time, ” and he
suggested that this would give rise to “prolonged and intense emotional disturbances.” Building
on these recommendations, by the 1970s scientists were beginning to publish papers with titles
like “Frustration in the Fowl”48 and “Do Hens Suffer in Battery Cages?”49 This was followed in
1980 by M. S. Dawkins’ Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare,50 and by the 1990s
a sizeable literature had developed on scientific means of assessing and mitigating a wide range
of affective states and motivations.
 To take one example, American mink (Mustela vison) are active, partially aquatic
carnivores which are often raised for their fur in restrictive cages. In the wild, mink perform a
wide range of behavior that is impossible in captivity; for example, they swim, rest in several nest
sites, survey the environment from raised perching places, and explore the burrows of potential
prey animals. In one study,51 mink in standard cages were trained to push against weighted doors
for access to various resources, including a tunnel, a raised platform, an alternative nest box, and
a small pool of water where they could swim. The experimenters then varied the amount of
weight that the mink had to lift in order to open different doors. Some resources, such as the
tunnel and the raised platform, were used when the price of entry was low, but not when it was
high. For other resources, notably the pool of water, the mink worked harder and harder as the
price increased, and maintained a relatively high rate of use. The authors concluded that “caging
mink in fur farms does cause the animals frustration, mainly because they are prevented from
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swimming.”52
 Revealing as it is, such research raises important philosophical issues. Can we conclude
from the evidence that mink experience a desire to swim, perhaps analogous to the desire for
companionship among socially isolated humans? Does the mink’s lack of language make such a
state less real to the mink, or morally less important, than an analogous desire by language-using
humans? What scientific evidence would justify applying the term “suffering” — with all its
moral implications — to mink that are prevented from swimming? Does evidence that captive
animals have a strong motivation for a resource imply that their keepers have a moral obligation
to provide it? The mink experiment was done largely because of ethical concerns about the
proper treatment of animals, but, as these questions show, there is a key role for philosophers to
play in helping to identify the moral implications of the empirical evidence.
Incorporating Science into the Ethical Debate.
We are not suggesting, of course, that knowledge obtained systematically from scientific research
trumps other ways of understanding the mental states of animals. Judgement, insight, and logic,
for example, obviously have roles to play.
 Nor are we suggesting that the scientific study of animal mentation is without its own
limitations and philosophical problems. Although the field dates back to the nineteenth
century,53 influential voices in twentieth century psychology and ethology claimed that science
should not attempt to understand the mental states of animals, nor use mental states in causal
explanations of animal behavior.54 As a result, the modern scientific study of animal mentation is
a relatively young area of research, and much remains to be done to provide generally accepted
methodology and criteria for settling questions about cognition and affective states of animals.55
To take one example, the performance of self-directed movements in a mirror has often been
taken as evidence of self-awareness, but this interpretation is not universally accepted.56 What
science offers, however, is a wealth of empirical material and an emerging methodology,
undergoing refinement through debate and experimentation, which should not be ignored or
used in a merely selective way when making claims about animal mentation.
 Nor do we suggest that philosophers have been uniformly inattentive to the potential
contributions of science. As an admirable example, David DeGrazia made extensive use of
scientific information in developing his arguments about feelings, self-awareness and other
mental states in animals.57 Bernard Rollin, in proposing that we should nurture and fulfill the
specific "nature" of different types of animals in our care, recognized the key role of science in
determining the features that make up an animal's “nature”.58 In a similar vein, James Rachels
argued that various human rights depend on the human species having certain attributes, and that
we should ascribe similar rights to other species depending on whether those species actually
share the same attributes. As Rachels noted, this approach will “avoid the trap of lumping all
nonhuman animals together.”59
 Despite these sound ventures, however, far too much remains at the level of ungrounded
speculation and excessive generalization, which a marriage of science and ethics may help us
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overcome. We suggest that future progress in animal ethics will require a combination of
scientifically informed philosophy and philosophically informed science. Philosophy is needed
especially to explore the ethical implications of our understanding of animals. This entails a
range of philosophical projects: examining the moral relevance of the capacity to use language,
clarifying the nature of our understanding of other minds, analyzing morally significant concepts
such as desire, suffering, and personhood, and clarifying the circumstances under which these
concepts can be rightly used in discussions of other species. Science is needed to provide a more
nuanced, disciplined and empirically grounded understanding of animals as a basis for ethical
reflection. Separately, they provide a measure of understanding. Taken together, they offer a
great deal more.
David Fraser
University of British Columbia
Rod Preece
Wilfrid Laurier University
Notes.
1. Dix Harwood’s Love for Animals and How It Developed in Great Britain (1928), edited,
introduced, and annotated by Rod Preece and David Fraser. (Lampeter: Mellen Animal Rights
Library, 2002), 6. Harwood’s use of the terms “anthropomorphic” and “anthropocentric” may
jar the expectations of modern readers. In behavioral biology “anthropomorphic” has come to
mean attributing human traits to other species; and “anthropocentric” is used by ethicists for
ethical thinking that considers only human interests; in both cases, a degree of error is often
implied.
2. That is, the Greek followers of Pythagoras, many of whom resided in the Greek colonies of
Magna Graecia in Italy, as did Pythagoras himself after spending his youth at Samos in Ionia.
Empedocles (c. 495BC to c. 435BC) lived in the Greek colony of Acaragas in Sicily and appears
to have been the first to condemn animal sacrifice on the grounds of its cruelty to the slaughtered
animals. Very little of the writings of the early Pythagoreans remains, and none of Pythagoras
himself. Thus one is required to rely on commentaries by later scholars.
3. The use of the phrase “irrational animals” does not suggest that either the Pythagoreans or
Sextus Empiricus thought of animals as lacking in reason. Rather, it was simply a concession to
contemporary linguistic convention.
4. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, 9, 127-9.
5. Porphyry exaggerates the universality of the Stoic denial of animal reason. Thus, for example,
Chrysippus, the most eminent of the Stoic philosophers save for Zeno, allowed the dog “even to
share in the far-famed ‘Dialectic.’” See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.14.
6. Perhaps Porphyry is referring to the Historia Animalium (588: A8), where Aristotle writes:
“just as in man we find knowledge, wisdom and sagacity, so in certain animals there exists some
other natural propensity akin to these.”
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7. Porphyry, On Abstinence from Animal Food, trans. Thomas Taylor ( c.1793) (Fontwell:
Centaur, 1965), 140-1.
8. See Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1997 [1935]), 389.
9. George Long, trans., The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (New
York: A.L. Burt, n.d. [ c. 1900], VI, 23; 196-7.
10. Book 2, Chapter 17. Nonetheless, elsewhere Augustine exhibits a modest degree of respect
for other species. See, for example, De natura boni, 12. 16; The City of God, Bk. xix, ch. 14;
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